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On November 4, 2008, Barack Obama won the United States
presidential election with 66,882,230 votes.1 Women accounted for
fifty-eight percent of Obama’s votes.2 In the entire presidential elec-
tion, women comprised fifty-three percent of the total votes cast, out-
numbering men by more than seven million votes.3 Since 1964, every
1. Election Center 2008, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/ (last visited Aug. 25,
2009).
2. I calculated this number using the election results as reported by the Federal
Election Commission, as well as election statistics reported by both CNN and the New
York Times. Of the 131,257,328 total votes cast in the 2008 presidential election, fifty-
three percent were from women, resulting in 69,566,384 votes cast by women. Among
those 69,566,384 women voters, fifty-six percent voted for Obama, resulting in 38,957,175
votes for Obama from women. Therefore, women represented fifty-eight percent of the
66,882,230 votes Obama received. 2008 Official Presidential General Election Results,
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/2008presgeresults.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2009);
Election Center 2008, Exit Polls, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls
.main/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2009); Election Results 2008, Exit Polls, http://elections
.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/exit-polls.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
3. Election Center 2008, Exit Polls, supra note 2.
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presidential election has seen women voting in higher numbers
than men.4 There are also more women registered to vote than
there are men.5
Not only do women participate as voters in the political arena,
but they are leaders as well. Within the past fifteen years alone, many
women have achieved political positions of great power and influ-
ence. For example, in 1993 Janet Reno was the first woman to serve
as the U.S. Attorney General; in 1997, Madeleine Albright became
the first woman appointed to the position of U.S. Secretary of State;
in 2001, Condoleezza Rice was appointed to the position of National
Security Advisor (formerly Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs) and in 2005 was appointed to the position of U.S.
Secretary of State; and Nancy Pelosi was the first woman elected to
serve as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives in 2007, mak-
ing her second in line for the presidency behind Vice President Dick
Cheney.6 Most recently, Hillary Clinton, the first first lady ever elected
to public office and the first woman elected to the Senate from New
York,7 became “the first viable female presidential candidate” during
the Democratic primaries in 2008,8 and Sarah Palin became the first
female vice presidential nominee for the Republican party.9
But this has not always been the case. America did not always
look kindly on a woman’s participation in such a public arena as
politics.10 A woman’s very presence in the public sphere was consid-
ered inappropriate.11 In fact, it was not until the late eighteenth
4. Press Release, Ctr. for Am. Women and Politics, Women’s Vote Watch: Women’s
Votes Could Determine Election Outcome (Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://www.cawp
.rutgers.edu/press_room/news/documents/PressRelease_10-10-08_womensvote.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Ctr. for American Women and Politics, Rutgers, State Univ. N.J., Fast Facts:
Firsts for Women in U.S. Politics, http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/resources/
Firsts.php (last visited Aug. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Fast Facts].
7. Id.
8. Linda Lowen, About.com, Women Candidates in 2008 — How Many Women
Candidates Ran in 2008?, Nov. 14, 2008, http://womensissues.about.com/od/thepolitical
arena/a/womencand2008.htm.
9. Fast Facts, supra note 6. Palin was not the first female vice presidential nominee
in American history; that distinction goes to Geraldine Ferraro, who was chosen as Walter
Mondale’s running-mate in the 1984 presidential election. However, because the Mondale/
Ferraro ticket was soundly trounced by the Reagan/Bush ticket and won only one state
in that election, the argument could be made that Palin was the first viable female vice
presidential candidate. Julia Baird, From Seneca Falls . . . to Sarah Palin?, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 22, 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/158893.
10. For purposes of simplicity, this Note will refer to the colonies and colonists as
“America” and “Americans,” respectively, recognizing that the land belonged to England
and the colonists considered themselves British subjects until after the American
Revolution.
11. Unfortunately due to time and space restrictions, this Note focuses on white
women and does not consider the plight of black women in America. The historic
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century that American women began to venture beyond their private
spheres into the public realm.12 Slowly at first, women began to par-
ticipate more and more frequently as the Revolution continued.13
Perhaps without many recognizing, or perhaps without many under-
standing its magnitude, change was happening. The politicization
of women had begun.
This Note will argue that in the midst of this changing America,
the U.S. Constitution was adopted and voted into law, and, contrary
to the conventional belief, neither the Founders nor the Constitution
were wholly insulated from the changes occurring in American soci-
ety. The Constitution may not have explicitly mentioned women in
the allocation of rights and responsibilities, but neither did it deny
any rights to women. This Note argues that the Constitution, per-
haps unwilling to go as far as explicitly guaranteeing women’s rights,
instead left open the very real — and in some cases realized — possi-
bility of states recognizing the rights of and granting rights to women.
Part I of this Note will focus on women and American society. It
will discuss a woman’s place in society before and during the American
Revolution. Part II will discuss the law of coverture.14 It will explore
the English-inherited form of coverture, the shades-of-grey cover-
ture adopted in the colonies, and how coverture was handled in the
Republic. Part III will argue that the question of female patriotism —
whether a woman could be political — was present in American
society. It will explore the extent to which this discussion occurred
and argue that, against this backdrop, the Constitution was created.
It will argue that the Constitution did not deny women rights and
instead left the question of women’s rights up to the states. It will
provide examples of how different states debated the place of women
in society, with some recognizing women’s rights, at least for a time,
and others denying them. Part IV will address the backlash women
faced as a result of their politicization. A brief conclusion will follow.
I. WOMEN AND SOCIETY
The American Revolution was not only a major turning point
in the history of America but the history of American women as well.
The experience of women vis-à-vis the Revolution served as the im-
petus for both their politicization and, later, their demands to be
experience of white women is different than that of black women, who faced oppression
on two levels: race and gender.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part I.
14. The doctrine of coverture was the process by which a married woman’s identity
was literally “covered” by that of her husband’s. See infra Part II.
208 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:205
recognized within America. “The war of the Revolution and the con-
stitutional experiments that followed composed one of the great ages
of political innovation in Western history; in these years the terms
were set by which future Americans would understand their relation-
ship to the social order.”15 In order to understand how the Revolution
changed women’s lives, it is first necessary to understand what life
was like prior to the Revolution.
A. Before the American Revolution
The American colonists inherited from the English the ideas that
the family was “the central focus of society”16 and a woman’s place
was in the familial home.17 These ideas exemplify the inherited tra-
ditions of the separate “spheres” for men and women,18 i.e., “the dichot-
omy between male public activity and female private passivity.”19
While men occupied the public sphere and represented their families
in the outside world, women were relegated to the private, domestic
sphere.20 Even within this domestic sphere, the man ruled the home
and the woman was expected to obey the man.21
Not surprisingly, then, a woman was not considered an inde-
pendent entity, nor was she allowed an “independent existence.” 22
Being feminine meant being “submissive[ ], dependen[t], and do-
mestic[ ].” 23 A woman was
virtually barred from the public sphere, and at home [was] under
male tutelage . . . . [She was] dependent and domestic, a creature
not of reason but of sentiment and love. Her mission was self-
sacrifice; the married woman had no important separate interests,
apart from the interests of the family — and those remained en-
tirely under her husband’s benevolent power. Her gaze properly
focused inward on the family, not outward on the world. She was
15. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 7 (1980) [hereinafter KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC].
16. Mary Beth Norton, The Evolution of White Women’s Experience in Early America,
89 AM. HIST. REV. 593, 596 (1984) [hereinafter Norton, Evolution].
17. LAUREL THATCHER ULRICH, GOOD WIVES: IMAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES OF
WOMEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND, 1650-1750 13 (1991).
18. COKIE ROBERTS, FOUNDING MOTHERS: THE WOMEN WHO RAISED OUR NATION 14
(2002).
19. MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY’S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE
OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800 8 (1996) [hereinafter NORTON, LIBERTY’S DAUGHTERS].
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id.
23. Kenneth L. Karst, Woman’s Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 456 (1984).
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not fully a citizen; indeed, she was to be excluded from public
roles, lest her seductive presence in the public arena distract men
from the light of reason that should illuminate that sphere.24
Best, then, to confine women “ ‘within the narrow Limits of Domestick
[sic] Offices, [because] when they stray beyond them, they move
excentrically [sic] and consequently without grace.’ ” 25
Women accepted this confinement to the private sphere of
domestic life.26 While aware of the public sphere inhabited by the
men,27 both men and women believed women should be content in
their private sphere.28 There was a great societal expectation that
domesticity “was . . . supposed to be the source of [a woman’s] sense
of pride and satisfaction. Regardless of the exact shape of her house-
hold role . . . she should find fulfillment in . . . [and] take pleasure in
performing the duties required of her as mistress of the home.” 29
Because of the adherence to the separate spheres, and women’s
acceptance of that separation, rarely did women venture beyond their
domestic realm.30 In the years immediately leading up to and during
the war, it proved necessary for women to venture beyond their homes
and join the Revolution.31 Women’s contributions to the wartime
efforts were a very important, arguably essential, component of the
success of the Revolution.32
B. The Revolutionary Woman
Thanks to the Revolution, and regardless of whether it was a
conscious change in America, “a woman’s place was changing.” 33
Change was not immediate, nor did women immediately come to
mind as necessary components of the Revolution: it was “[n]ot until
economic boycott became a major mode of resistance to England [that
it became] obvious that women would also have to be pulled out of
the privacy of their traditional domain and propelled into the public
world of political decisions.” 34 Contemplating how to effectively resist
England, Christopher Gadsen in 1769 had this message for the men:
24. Id. at 458.
25. NORTON, LIBERTY’S DAUGHTERS, supra note 19, at 8.
26. Id. at 7.
27. ROBERTS, supra note 18.
28. NORTON, LIBERTY’S DAUGHTERS, supra note 19, at 34.
29. Id.
30. SEE HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492-PRESENT
109 (2003).
31. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 8.
32. Paula Baker, The Domestication of Politics, Women and American Political
Society, 1780-1920, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 620, 624 (1984).
33. ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 40 (emphasis added).
34. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 8.
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[T]he greatest difficulty of all we have to encounter . . . [is] to
persuade our wives to give us their assistance, without which ‘tis
impossible to succeed. I allow of the impossibility of succeeding
without their concurrence. . . . [O]ur political salvation, at this
crisis, depends altogether upon the strictest oeconomy [sic], that
the women could, with propriety, have the principal management
thereof; for ‘tis well known, that none in the world are better
oeconomists [sic], make better wives or more tender mothers, than
ours. Only let their husbands point out the necessity of such a
conduct; convince them, that it is the only thing that can save
them and their children, from distresses, slavery, and disgrace;
their affections will soon be awakened, and cooperate with their
reason. When that is done, all that is necessary will be done; for
I am persuaded, that they will be then as anxious and persevering
in this matter, as any the most zealous of us can possibly wish.35
This observation made in the years leading up to the Revolution
sheds important light upon women’s first steps into the public sphere.
First, Gadsen is addressing the men; he is not trying to inspire the
women but rather rally their husbands.36 Additionally, Gadsen rec-
ognized the negative impact women in their domestic spheres could
have by undermining the pre-war boycotts, even unintentionally.37
Furthermore, because Gadsen believed that women only acted in con-
nection with their domestic and familial duties, husbands would have
to convince their wives to join the economic boycotts by couching their
language in terms the women would understand and accept, i.e., in
language relating to the private sphere.38
Yet despite the fact that women entered the public sphere at the
behest of their husbands, and because they believed they were still
fulfilling their domestic obligations, the first steps were being taken.
Women were leaving their homes to engage in political activity. These
pre-war boycotts to which the husbands called their wives “initiated
the politicization of the household economy and marked the beginning
of the use of a political language that explicitly included women.”39
As the Revolution progressed, women became more and more
involved in the political climate of the day. As consumers, they were
asked to refrain from wearing British clothes and instead to wear
35. Id. at 36-37 (quoting Christopher Gadsen, To the Planters, Mechanics, and
Freeholders of the Province of South Carolina, No Ways Concerned in the Importation
of British Manufacturers, in THE WRITINGS OF CHRISTOPHER GADSEN 83, 84 (Richard
Walsh ed., 1966)).
36. Id. at 37.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 41.
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“homespun” clothing.40 It was also their job to “buy American” in order
to demonstrate their patriotism and “provide a protected market for
domestic goods.” 41 Additionally, women became part of a police force
of sorts: “They joined in the mobs, tarring and feathering merchants
who defied the boycott against British goods.” 42 They took part in
mobs that “police[d] local merchants who hoarded scarce commod-
ities.” 43 Some women even “took part in urban crowd actions, orga-
nized petition campaigns, and formed groups to help soldiers and
widows.” 44 Finally, it also fell to the women to continue their hus-
bands’ work on farms and in businesses while their husbands were
away during the war.45
These examples are not meant to suggest, however, that the
majority of women undertook such direct political action.46 In fact,
most women aided the war effort “in an institutional context,” pro-
viding services “as cooks, washerwomen, laundresses, private nurses,
and renters of houses or of rooms . . . .” 47 These services, though
more broadly rendered, “did not change their domestic identity,” nor
did they “seriously challenge the traditional definition of the woman’s
domestic domain.” 48
The point is that some women, not all or even most, were engag-
ing in the public sphere where before none had been. Initially, most
of these women were probably engaging in political activity without
the conscious recognition that they were in the public sphere.49 Given
that most calls to action came from their husbands and were couched
in terms of domestic obligation, “[t]he notion that politics was some-
how not part of the woman’s domain persisted throughout the war,
expressed even by women whose own lives were in fact directly depen-
dent on political developments and who had a sophisticated under-
standing of political maneuver.” 50 As time went on, however, women,
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id. at 45.
42. ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 40.
43. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 43.
44. Baker, supra note 32, at 624.
45. Id.; see also KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 48 (offering a
brief explanation of women’s roles when their husbands were away); NORTON, LIBERTY’S
DAUGHTERS, supra note 19, at 8 (explaining what instructions husbands did and did not
feel necessary to send to their wives while the men were away).
46. The example of women continuing work on farms or in businesses, however, is
an exception, as “[i]t was taken for granted that women would maintain the household
economy while their menfolk were at war.” KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra
note 15, at 48.
47. Id. at 73.
48. Id. at 73-74.
49. See id. (arguing that although women’s actions had political consequences, they
did not tend to view these actions in political terms).
50. Id. at 74.
212 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:205
and men too, were becoming increasingly aware of women’s entrance
into the public sphere.51
II. COVERTURE
Although America gained independence from the Revolution,
“there was no sharp legal break with the past. The common law sys-
tem (American style) remained intact. Indeed, in some sense, the aim
of the Revolution was continuity, not overthrow: continuity of the
colonial traditions, laws, and ways of life.” 52 It is therefore necessary
to understand the English traditions America inherited before con-
tinuing any further.
A. The English Tradition of Coverture
Inherited from the English common law, coverture referred to
“the system of law that transferred a woman’s civic identity to her
husband at marriage, giving him use and direction of her property
throughout the marriage.” 53 William Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Law of England, an influential eighteenth-century treatise on
English common law, described coverture in the following way:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover,
she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-french
a feme-covert; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection
and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her con-
dition during her marriage is called her coverture.54
A married woman was a feme covert; her identity was literally
“covered” by that of her husband.55
51. See infra Part III.
52. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 32 (2002).
53. Linda K. Kerber, The Paradox of Women’s Citizenship in the Early Republic: The
Case of Martin vs. Massachusetts, 1805, 97 AM. HIST. REV. 349, 351 (1992) [hereinafter
Kerber, Paradox].
54. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441 (17th
ed. 1830), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch15.asp.
55. Id. The feme sole was the opposite: she was the single, unmarried woman. This
distinction between the feme covert and the feme sole was explained by Blackstone in his
Commentaries when he was discussing the Queen of England. He wrote:
the queen is of ability to purchase lands, and to convey them, to make leases,
to grant copyholds, and do other acts of ownership, without the concurrence
of her lord; which no other married woman can do . . . . She may also sue
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Coverture had specific legal consequences that the courts acknowl-
edged as well: “The law considers a feme-covert as having no will; she
is under the direction and control of her husband; is bound to obey
his commands . . . .” 56 Because a woman was “covered,” subordinate
to the will and control of her husband, any property she owned auto-
matically became her husband’s property upon marriage; and she
was not thought to be able to act for herself or of her own free will,
so any crimes she committed, “except perhaps treason and murder,”
were attributed to the husband and not the wife.57
B. The Pennsylvania Criminal Cases
As black and white as the doctrine of coverture may have seemed,
however, this was not always the case. In G.S. Rowe’s article, Femes
Covert and Criminal Prosecution in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania,
Rowe demonstrates that the law could, and often did, acknowledge
women’s legal identities as separate from that of their husbands’.58
Despite the seeming rigidity of the doctrine of coverture, the colo-
nies were not bound to apply the legal doctrine; they could determine
for themselves how they wanted to recothe law.59
Rowe, through an examination of Pennsylvania cases from the
eighteenth century,60 argues that despite the legal theories of the
day, the reality is that the law was more flexible than it might at first
have seemed, and women could retain a legal identity:
To what degree and under what conditions the legal rights she
relinquished [when she married] seriously compromised her
position in civil matters (and civil litigation) . . . remains the
subject of lively debate. Historians who insist that a large degree
and be sued alone, without joining her husband. She may also have a
separate property in goods as well as lands, and has a right to dispose of
them by will. In short, she is in all legal proceedings looked upon as a feme
sole, and not as a feme covert; as a single, not as a married woman.
Id. at 218.
56. Martin v. Commonwealth, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 260, 293 (1805).
57. BLACKSTONE, supra note 54, at 444. In fact, it was specifically recognized that
treason could be committed by women both married and unmarried:
Even before the Declaration of Independence, a treason statute was passed
by the Continental Congress that carefully avoided the use of the generic
he in declaring that “all persons abiding within any of the United Colonies,
and deriving protection from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to the
said laws, and are members of such colony.”
KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 121.
58. G.S. Rowe, Femes Covert and Criminal Prosecution in Eighteenth-Century
Pennsylvania, 32 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 138, 147-56 (1988).
59. See id. at 140 (noting that states did not have a “unified practice”).
60. Rowe’s case material comes mainly from old cases only available in historical
societies and courthouses. Id. at 138 n.1.
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of autonomy was exercised by femes covert in civil matters, de-
spite Blackstone’s assertion that they were “civilly dead,” do so by
stressing that society and the legal system proved more flexible
and generous than the law itself.61
This was especially true in criminal matters. Based on the legal theory
and custom of the time, coverture should have provided married
women a shield of sorts if she committed a crime.62 According to the
legal theory laid out by Blackstone, a woman who committed “ ‘theft,
burglary or other . . . offenses against the laws of society, by the co-
ercion of her husband, or even in his company which the law construes
as coercion . . . [was] not guilty of any crime; being considered as act-
ing by compulsion, and not of her own free will.’ ” 63 This was because
“[h]er guilt or innocence presumably was less crucial in legal theory
than her subservience to her mate.” 64 The courts, however, did not
always adhere to the legal theory.
Rowe offers some impressive statistics regarding femes covert
and criminal prosecution.65 Pennsylvania court records reveal that
of the “nearly 25,000 individuals” prosecuted in Pennsylvania courts
prior to the nineteenth century, “more than 3700 [of them were]
women,” and of whom “four hundred and seventy-seven are clearly
identifiable as married.” 66 In a fifty-year span between 1750 and
1800, 276 wives were prosecuted alongside their husbands, and 266
other wives were charged independently with the same crime their
spouse had committed.67 Considering that women should have had
no independent legal identity once married, these statistics offer
valuable insight into the reality of the legal system. Apparently the
doctrine of coverture was not a hard-and-fast rule to be applied in
all cases involving married women; rather, “some discretion was
available to justices of the peace, prosecuting attorneys, and indeed
to petit jurors.” 68
The importance of Rowe’s research is its demonstration that, at
first glance, the doctrine of coverture seems rigid and inflexible: a
woman gets married and loses all of her independent legal rights. She
is therefore a dependent creature unable to make her own decisions,
which in turn means she should not be allowed access to the public
61. Id. at 140.
62. See supra Part II.A.
63. Rowe, supra note 58, at 141 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 54, at 8).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 142.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 144.
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sphere. But the truth is that the law was much more flexible in its
treatment of women than one might have originally thought.
C. The Republic and Coverture
Because the “Americans had no intention of relinquishing the
entire British legal tradition,” especially as it related to coverture, this
flexibility becomes especially important to the treatment of women’s
political actions during the American Revolution.69 “[W]omen [were
caught] in a double bind: women left at home while their husbands
fought for the loyalists were often ostracized by their communities and
forced into exile without being asked their own political opinions.” 70
And women who left home with their husbands also faced difficulties
because they risked losing their dower rights to their husband’s land.71
When a man declared allegiance to and left to fight for England, the
usual punishment doled out by the colonies was seizure of the prop-
erty left behind.72 The problem, however, was that “[n]ormally his
wife claimed a dower right to a life estate in one-third of his landed
property after his death,” and so the question arose as to whether the
wife should still possess a dower right in the land.73
After the Revolution, the states decided this question individually
for themselves.74 The Massachusetts legislature, perhaps the most
radical in this regard, required that “if a woman wished the Republic
to preserve her property rights in her husband’s estate, she must make
her own political commitment. The Republic promised to protect her
property only if she remained in America, dissociated herself from her
husband, and declared her own political allegiance.” 75 Conversely,
“should a woman accompany her husband into exile, patriots would
assume that she was making her own political choice, and they would
treat her property as forfeit.” 76 Clearly, then, Massachusetts was en-
couraging women to make political decisions; in fact, Massachusetts
required such political decisions if a woman wanted to hold on to
her property.77
Generally, however, states and “[c]ourts did not try to catch the
loyalist’s wife between the reality of dependence on her husband for
69. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 119.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 123.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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support and the radical claim that she should have established
her own individual commitment to the Republic.” 78 The majority of
women who left with their husbands could reclaim their property
after the war was over.79 The point to be made here, however, is that
Massachusetts did require political allegiance from women independ-
ent of their husbands’ allegiance when previously no such require-
ment was made.
The doctrine of coverture typically meant a wife’s identity was
covered by that of her husband, and yet women were increasingly
participating in the public sphere and even being asked to give alle-
giances separate from those of their husbands. The Revolution, there-
fore, raised one very important question particularly relevant to this
Note: could women be patriots?
III. THE REPUBLIC
A. Female Patriotism
In order to answer the question of whether women could be seen
as political creatures, capable of embodying such an intensely polit-
ical idea like that of patriotism, it must first be understood that there
was a “deep skepticism toward political behavior” that pervaded
American society.80 Even the Revolution and the Republic’s most
political and ambitious men “rarely acknowledged what they were
doing [i.e., building successful political careers], even to close friends;
often they did not acknowledge their political drive to themselves.” 81
Perhaps it was this deep distrust of political behavior more than any-
thing else that kept women, who by today’s standards would be exem-
plars of patriotism, from declaring themselves patriots outright.82
In any event, history tells us that women were, indeed, both polit-
ically aware83 and politically active.84 Political commentary tended
to originate from “privileged women who had some status from which
to speak freely.” 85 Their political observations tended to be confined
78. Id. at 9; see also id. at 125-27 (offering a brief explanation of how other states
treated women and dower rights).
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. at 73.
81. Id.
82. For examples of women’s patriotic acts, see supra Part I.B.
83. ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that the letters and diaries of pre-
Revolutionary women were “filled with political observations”); see also KERBER, WOMEN
OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 76-85 (discussing the content of women’s political
discussions).
84. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 85-103 (noting that women
used petitions as political tools and campaigned to raise money for the troops).
85. ZINN, supra note 30, at 110.
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to “portfolios and . . . diaries.” 86 When women commented on politics
in letters and correspondence to family and friends, they often felt
compelled to apologize for doing so.87 It is possible that these apolo-
gies served as a “way of acknowledging that they were doing some-
thing unusual” by offering their political observations “in the absence
of an established tradition of female public political behavior.” 88 Re-
member that these women largely spent their time confined to the
domestic sphere of home and family.89 The importance of these polit-
ical observations demonstrates that “politics did intrude into the
women’s world during the trauma of the war[,] . . . and as it did women
acknowledged its presence and responded to it.” 90
One woman in particular who loomed large in discussions re-
garding politics and the public sphere was Abigail Adams. Openly
political, Abigail Adams wrote in 1775 regarding the Revolution:
I would not have my Friend immagine [sic] that with all my fears
and apprehension, I would give up one Iota of our rights and
privilages [sic] . . . . [W]e cannot be happy without being free . . .
we cannot be free without being secure in our property . . . we
cannot be secure in our property if without our consent others
may as by right take it away. — We know too well the blessings
of freedom, to tamely resign it.91
Her husband John Adams “relied explicitly on his wife for local politi-
cal news, and he expected her to keep his political fences mended.” 92
Indeed later, during his presidency, she was publicly known to be in
charge of handling some of his correspondences.93
Abigail Adams was also an early believer in women’s rights.94 She
wrote to her husband, even before the Declaration of Independence
was written:
I long to hear that you have declared an independancy [sic] —
and by the way in the new Code of Law which I suppose it will
be necessary for you to make I desire you would Remember the
86. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 84.
87. Id. at 76-80.
88. Id. at 80.
89. Id. at 85.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Letter from Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren (Feb. 3, 1775), in 1 ADAMS
FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 184 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1963).
92. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 82; ROBERTS, supra note 18,
at 174 (noting that John Adams wrote to Abigail, “I always learn more of politics from
your letters than any others”).
93. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 82.
94. ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 173.
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Ladies, and be more generous and favourable [sic] to them than
your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands
of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they
could. If perticuliar [sic] care and attention is not paid to the
Laidies [sic] we are determined to foment a Rebelion [sic], and will
not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice,
or Representation.95
Not only did Abigail Adams ask that the men “remember the ladies,”
she even threatened “Rebelion” if the men did not do so! She re-
newed this discussion of female equality again towards the end of
the Revolution:
Patriotism in the female sex . . . is the most disinterested of all
virtues. Excluded from honours [sic] and from offices, we cannot
attach ourselves to the State of Government from having held a
place of Eminence. Even in freest countrys [sic] our property is
subject to the controul [sic] and disposal of our partners, to whom
the Laws have given a sovereign Authority. Deprived of a voice
in Legislation, obliged to submit to those Laws which are imposed
upon us, is it not sufficient to make us indifferent to the publick
[sic] Welfare? Yet all History and every age exhibit Instances of
patriotic virtue in the female Sex; which considering our situation
equals the most Heroick [sic].96
Clearly, Abigail Adams did not hesitate to express her political views
to her husband.
John Adams, for his part, seemed not to have taken her pleas
to “remember the ladies” 97 all too seriously. He responded to her:
As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh.
We have been told that our Struggle has loosened the bands of
Government every where . . . . But your Letter was the first
Intimation that another Tribe [i.e. women] more numerous and
powerfull [sic] than all the rest were grown discontented. — This
is rather too coarse a Compliment but you are so saucy, I won’t
blot it out.98
95. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in SOMETHING THAT
WILL SURPRISE THE WORLD: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 202,
203 (Susan Dunn ed., 2006).
96. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (June 17, 1782), in 4 ADAMS FAMILY
CORRESPONDENCE 328 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1963).
97. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), supra note 95.
98. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 91, at 382.
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John Adams was clearly amused by his wife’s letter. His reply rang of
mockery when he wrote that the women were a “[t]ribe more nu-
merous and powerfull [sic] than all the rest.” 99 He went on to assure
her that, although the “[m]asculine systems” would remain in place,
it was actually men who were the “subjects” and masters in name
only.100 And men could not give up that title lest it “would com-
pleatly [sic] subject [them] to the Despotism of the peticoat [sic].”101
Despite the seeming dismissal of Abigail Adams’s desire for
women’s rights, John Adams did not seem to think women were nec-
essarily intellectually incapable of political participation. In a letter
he wrote to James Sullivan, responding to Sullivan’s proposal that the
vote should be extended to men without property, John Adams replied:
The same reasoning which will induce you to admit all men who
have no property, to vote, with those who have, for those laws
which affect the person, will prove that you ought to admit women
and children; for, generally speaking, women and children have
as good judgments, and as independent minds, as those men who
are wholly destitute of property; these last being to all intents and
purposes as much dependent upon others, who will please to feed,
clothe, and employ them, as women are upon their husbands, or
children on their parents.102
The crux of the issue was independence of political action.103 The
political citizen was understood to be a “person who belonged to the
nation and had the independence and virtue to participate fully as
a voter.”104 Because political rights included the right to vote and
hold office, the most important quality of a political citizen was that
he had to have the independence necessary to participate in politics.105
This emphasis on independence became problematic when the
discussion turned to women. Independence required “freedom of
judgment — freedom from the imposition of the will of another —
[which] in the eighteenth century . . . meant heading a household
and owning property of one’s own so as not to have to look to anyone




102. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in SOMETHING THAT
WILL SURPRISE THE WORLD: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS, supra
note 95, at 204, 205.
103. Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830-
1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1448 (1998).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1451.
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married women were unable to attain this level of independence.107
According to John Adams, neither were men who did not own their
own property.108 Men who did not have their own property were as
likely to be influenced by those who would employ them as women
were by their husbands.109 If the vote was to be extended to men
without property, it might as well be extended to women also.110
It is important to understand that John Adams was not advocat-
ing for women’s right to vote in his letter to Sullivan. Instead, Adams
was using the example of the dependent feme covert to demonstrate
why the vote should not be extended to dependent, i.e., “propertyless,”
men. The interesting part about the letter, however, is the fact that
John Adams made no mention of women’s intellectual capacity with
regard to the vote. The inference to be drawn from the letter is that,
except for their dependence on others, femes covert and propertyless
men would have the capacity to vote.
Female equality was not a discussion limited to the Adams family.
These “[i]deas of female equality were in the air during and after the
Revolution.”111 One such notable source was Mary Wollstonecraft’s
Vindication of the Rights of Woman.112 Although Wollstonecraft was
“express[ing] what a larger public was already experiencing or was
willing to hear,” her book nonetheless “found resonant echoes in
America.”113 Additionally, it is likely that at least some of the popu-
lation was aware of the “debate concerning women’s place in society
that accompanied the early years of the French Revolution.”114
Of course, this is not to say that everyone supported female
equality. For example, when Thomas Jefferson’s “Secretary of the
Treasury Albert Gallatin had the presumption to suggest . . . [that
Jefferson] might consider women for public service . . . [he] elicited
this sharp rejoinder: ‘The appointment of a woman to office is an inno-
vation for which the public is not prepared, nor am I.’ ”115 Again, the
point is not that men advocated for women’s rights, but merely that
107. Id.
108. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, supra note 102, at 204.
109. Id. at 204-05.
110. Id. at 205.
111. ZINN, supra note 30, at 111.
112. Id.
113. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 222-24. Aaron Burr, for
example, thought Wollstonecraft’s book was “ ‘a work of genius’ and recommended it to
his wife with the promise to read it aloud to her.” Id. at 224.
114. Judith Apter Klinghoffer & Lois Elkis, “The Petticoat Electors”: Women’s Suffrage
in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 159, 173 (1992).
115. Richard B. Morris, “We the People of the United States”: The Bicentennial of a
People’s Revolution, 82 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 4 (1977) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to the Secretary of the Treasury (Jan. 13, 1807), in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 9:7
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892-99)).
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they were aware of these discussions at the time the Constitutional
Convention convened in Philadelphia.
B. The Constitution
This Note does not intend to argue that the Founding Fathers
included women in the Constitution, or even that they thought
women should be included. Instead, the premise of this Note is that
the Constitution was adopted during a period of societal change.
This change may not have been recognized or fully understood, but
it was happening nonetheless. Women were venturing outside their
private spheres, beginning to take up discourse about politics, and
talk of female equality was starting to permeate American society.
In the midst of all of these changes, the Founding Fathers did
nothing to stop women. They could have drafted a constitution that
specifically and unequivocally limited women’s rights and excluded
them from anything outside the domestic sphere. But they did not do
so. Instead, they drafted a Constitution that began “We the People”116
and never once referenced “man” or “men.”117 “If it is true that the
society of 1787 was sexist, the remarkable thing is that the Consti-
tution . . . nevertheless shows no linguistic trace of that sexism.”118
Specifically, “the Constitution does not deny women the right
to vote. It is true that the Constitution does not guarantee them the
right to vote, but neither does it guarantee that right to men.”119 In-
stead, the Constitution leaves the vote to the states.120 States can
determine voter eligibility by any means they choose, “leav[ing] the
states free to include women as they see fit, just as it leaves to states
the determination of whether there should be a property qualification
for voting.”121
C. States and Women’s Rights After the Adoption of the
Constitution
1. New Jersey: The Petticoat Electors122
Perhaps the best example of such state-determined voter eligi-
bility that enfranchised women is that of New Jersey. In 1776 New
116. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
117. U.S. CONST.
118. Glen E. Thurow, “The Form Most Eligible”: Liberty in the Constitutional
Convention, 20 PUBLIUS 15, 30 (1990).
119. Id. at 29.
120. Id. at 29-30; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”).
121. Thurow, supra note 118, at 30.
122. The term “Petticoat Electors” comes from the article used as the main source for
this section. Klinghoffer & Elkis, supra note 114, at 159.
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Jersey adopted into its state constitution a suffrage clause that read:
“That all freeholders, and householders, inhabitants of this colony,
who are worth fifty pounds clear estate in the same, shall be admit-
ted to vote representation in Assembly and also for all other public
officers that shall be elected by the people.”123 When other state con-
stitutions were limiting the vote to men, specifically white men, the
New Jersey Constitution considered eligible anyone who had the
requisite amount of property.124
New Jersey women were notably politicized.125 Perhaps the
gender-neutral suffrage clause of the New Jersey Constitution re-
flected the strong politicization of these women. Perhaps the New
Jersey legislature hoped to secure the allegiance of these rather
independent women by “includ[ing] them . . . in the body politic.”126
Regardless, the wording of the suffrage clause was phrased in delib-
erately gender-neutral terms; it was not a mistake or “the result of
simple carelessness due to haste.”127
Because of “their location in the heart of battle,” New Jersey
women were especially exposed to the politicizing effects of the
Revolution.128 Such was the politicization of the women in this state
that these women “did not hesitate to take positions markedly in
variance with that of other members of their family,”129 nor were
these women unwilling “to take up arms in support of the patriotic
cause.”130 Even the Governor of New Jersey, using a female pseud-
onym, appealed to the political sensibilities of these women.131 Rather
than end the Revolution in compromise with the English, he urged
women to “ ‘draw their pens’ and enter their ‘solemn protest’ against
all efforts to reach a compromise solution to the war.”132
After the Revolution, all New Jersey citizens, not just the women,
were eager to “turn[ ] away from public affairs” so that they might
“rebuild their lives and state.”133 Politics was relegated to the back-
burner in the minds of the population.134 In 1789, however, a few
123. Id. at 166.
124. Id. at 159, 168.
125. Id. at 168.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 166-67.
128. Id. at 169.
129. Id. at 168.
130. Id. at 169.
131. Id. at 171.
132. Id. (quoting Belinda, Letter to the Editor, N.J. GAZETTE, May 6, 1778, reprinted
in NEW JERSEY IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1783, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, at
340-41 (Larry R. Gerlach ed., 1975)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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years after the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the state was re-
politicized when “an attempt to control the elections”135 of statewide
congressional representatives saw the “birth of the . . . Federalist
party”136 and the “rejuvenation of party strife.”137
In an effort to “widen their political base,” the Federalists sought
the inclusion of women in the voting process.138 They “emphasiz[ed]
the suitability and desirability of female political participation,” but
only in the seven counties of the state that boasted the largest
Federalist population.139 They campaigned for female political par-
ticipation only where it would be of the most help to their Federalist
party.140 Despite their motives, one female commentator noted, “I
congratulate the ladies of New Jersey that they are in some thing put
on a footing with the gentlemen and the most extraordinary part it
is, that it has been done by the gentlemen themselves . . . .”141
What was done by men, however, could be undone by men. Histo-
rians recognize “the turn of the century as a period in which the
boundaries between the sexes were sharpened and women left or
were pushed out of the formal political arena.” 142 Coinciding with
this trend, the end of the eighteenth century saw Federalist verve
for female political participation waning.143 No longer could the
Federalists “be counted among the supporters of the political rights
of the ladies of New Jersey.”144 At least part of this change of heart
can be explained by changes in voting mechanics in New Jersey, which
gave the Republican party greater access to women voters as well.145
The Federalists worried that suffrage would benefit Republicans over
their own party.146 Of course later when the Republican party had
risen to some power, they in turn feared that suffrage would benefit
the Federalist party and not their own.147 Eventually, it was party
politics that led to a revision of the state constitution and the disen-
franchisement of women.148
Probably the most damaging aspect of the disenfranchisement
was not that women lost the right to vote, but that along with losing
135. Id. at 171-72.
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access to that “political process, [women] also [lost] their image as
virtuous individuals.”149 Disenfranchisement was justified “by empha-
sizing [women’s] irrationality and pliancy,” which was “incompatible
with the independence of heart and mind” necessary for participants
in the political sphere.150 Although party politics was the impetus
behind disenfranchising New Jersey’s women, the “growth of gender
ideology,” which was so central to the backlash that forced women
back into their private spheres, gave the state an alternative and
readily-available rhetoric with which to explain their actions.151
2. Massachusetts: Martin v. Commonwealth (1805)152
Massachusetts is another example of a state engaging in an
internal dialogue regarding the treatment of its women citizens. In
Martin, the Attorney General of Massachusetts argued that Anna
Martin’s lands had been properly confiscated by the State because,
although a feme covert, she had acted in an independent, politicized
manner such that she and her husband were both traitors.153 Although
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ultimately rejected this argu-
ment, unwilling to alter the traditional feme covert doctrine, it is
important to recognize that states were engaging in such internal
conversations regarding the status of women.154
William and Anna Martin were Loyalists.155 William Martin was
an officer in the Royal Regiment of Artillery.156 When the American
Revolution erupted, the Martins left with the British.157 When the
Martins fled Massachusetts and New Hampshire, both states confis-
cated the property the Martins left behind.158 In February of 1801,
James Martin, the son of William and Anna Martin, filed a writ of
error to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts demanding the return
of his mother’s property.159 In order to prevail in his suit, James
Martin had to convince the court that the doctrine of coverture
149. Id. at 191.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 192.
152. Martin v. Commonwealth, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 260 (1805).
153. Id. at 276.
154. Id. at 290-97.
155. Kerber, Paradox, supra note 53, at 355-56.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 356.
158. Id. at 357. Massachusetts acted under the authority of the Massachusetts
Confiscation Act, which declared that anyone who had “left this State . . . & joined the
Enemies thereof” forfeited any rights to property they had previously owned. Id. at 357
n.25.
159. Id. at 349.
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meant that his mother had not acted of her own free will when she
and William Martin had fled America with the British.160
When a woman married, her property came under the control
of her husband.161 Interestingly, however, control was all the hus-
band could exercise over the property; ownership remained in the
woman’s family.162 When Anna Martin, previously Anna Gordon,
married William Martin, her property became his to control.163 Any
“real estate that came to her by bequest was set off to her directly . . .
[she would retain] a right of remainder in it, and it would descend to
her heirs.”164 So assuming the husband did not waste the property
during his life, upon the death of both William and Anna (because
“William Martin was ‘seized and possessed’ of Anna Martin’s prop-
erties only ‘during his natural life’ ”), the property would pass either
to her heirs or revert back to the Gordon line; it would not pass to
William Martin’s heirs.165 This was important in Martin v. Common-
wealth because the property Massachusetts had confiscated had
belonged to Anna Martin, not William Martin.166 James Martin,
therefore, had the opportunity to reclaim his mother’s property by
demonstrating that the doctrine of coverture prevented the state
from applying the Confiscation Act to her property because she was
subordinate to the will of her husband.167
While James Martin utilized the theory of coverture, the Attorney
General and Solicitor General for Massachusetts argued the oppo-
site.168 They presented to the court “a woman who had been redefined
as a competent citizen by revolutionary legislation and challenged
to make her own political choices in the crucible of revolution.”169 The
American Revolution had “broaden[ed] the obligations of citizenship
to stretch past physical service and include the emotional and mental
act of allegiance. Women could share this sort of citizenship, and . . .
women could also share its obligations.”170
The Massachusetts Supreme Court ultimately rejected the idea
of the married, politicized woman.171 The court relied on the inherited
160. Martin v. Commonwealth, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 260, 284 (1805) (“The real question
is, whether the statute was intended to include persons who have, by law, no wills of
their own.”).
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tradition of coverture to make its decision.172 The court upheld the
notion that, “[i]n the relation of husband and wife, the law makes, in
her behalf, such an allowance for the authority of the husband, and
her duty of obedience, that guilt is not imputed to her for actions
performed jointly by them.”173 A married woman who commits an of-
fense is “exempted from punishment, not because she is not within
the letter of the law . . . but because she is viewed in such a state of
subjection, and so under the control of her husband, that she acts
merely as his instrument, and . . . no guilt is imputable to her.”174
Furthermore, the court did not want to punish wives for obedi-
ence to their husbands:
Can we believe that a wife, for so respecting the understanding
of her husband as to submit her own opinions to his, on a subject
so all-important as this, should lose her own property, and forfeit
the inheritance of her children? Was she to be considered as crim-
inal because she permitted her husband to elect his own and her
place of residence? Because she did not, in violation of her mar-
riage vows, rebel against the will of her husband?175
It would be ridiculous, the court determined, that anyone might argue
that “it was the intention of the legislature to demand of femes-
covert their aid and assistance in the support of their constitution
of government.”176 The Massachusetts Confiscation Act was never
meant to force wives to “oblige them either to lose their property or to
be guilty of a breach of the duty, which, by the laws of their country
and the law of God, they owed to their husbands.”177
The Massachusetts Supreme Court therefore ruled for James
Martin, holding that the property of femes covert could not be con-
fiscated under the Confiscation Act.178 Anna Martin was “[a] wife
who left the country in the company of her husband [and] did not
withdraw herself; but was . . . withdrawn by him. She did not de-
prive the government of the benefit of her personal services; she had
none to render; none were exacted of her.”179
The case of Martin v. Commonwealth is interesting because the
State argued that the Revolution had created a politicized, married
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woman.180 The State argued that any wife who therefore left America
with her husband became a traitor just as her husband was a trai-
tor.181 It was not the Constitution that required Massachusetts to see
married women as femes covert, incapable of any independent action;
it was the Massachusetts Supreme Court that was unwilling to extend
such an idea of politicization and independence to the femes covert
of their state.182 The court maintained the status quo and held that
“[t]he law considers a feme-covert as having no will; she is under the
direction and control of her husband; is bound to obey his commands;
and in many cases which might be mentioned . . . cannot jointly with
her husband act at all.”183
3. Illinois: Bradwell v. State (1873)184
The case of Bradwell demonstrates that states were still respon-
sible for deciding the rights of women, even after nearly a century
had passed since the Constitution was adopted.185 Additionally, Justice
Bradley’s concurrence in Bradwell further demonstrates that the idea
of the separate spheres for men and women was still in strong circu-
lation throughout the country.186 The backlash from the Revolution’s
creation of the politicized woman had great staying power.187
In 1873 Myra Bradwell applied to the Illinois Supreme Court for
a license to practice law.188 The State had previously granted her a
special charter that allowed her to “edit [and] publish the Chicago
Legal News as her own business.”189 It was a successful business, and
Chicago’s attorneys even relied on her Legal News for their records
after the great Chicago fire of 1871 destroyed many of their law
offices.190 Bradwell studied law with her husband, a lawyer, and in
1873 applied for her own license to practice.191 Having once been a
citizen of Vermont but now residing in Chicago, Illinois, Bradwell
asserted her right to a license in Illinois based on the privileges and
180. Id. at 275-76.
181. Id. at 276.
182. Id. at 290-91.
183. Id. at 293.
184. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
185. Id. at 139.
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187. See supra Part IV for a discussion of women’s suffrage post-Revolution.
188. Linda K. Kerber, “Ourselves and Our Daughters Forever”: Women and the
Constitution, 1787-1876, THIS CONST.: A BICENTENNIAL CHRON., Spring 1985, at 25, 32,
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immunities provision in Article IV of the Constitution192 and the
Fourteenth Amendment193 to the Constitution.194
The Illinois Supreme Court denied her application.195 It held that,
though the state legislature had given it broad discretion regarding
whom to admit to the practice of law, one of the limitations placed on
the court was “that it should not admit any persons or class of per-
sons who are not intended by the legislature to be admitted, even
though their exclusion is not expressly required.”196 Such limita-
tions, the court said, “must operate to prevent our admitting women
to the office of attorney at law. If we were to admit them, we should
be exercising the authority conferred upon us in a manner which . . .
was never contemplated by the legislature.”197 Bradwell was married,
which made her a feme covert in the eyes of the law, and the Illinois
Supreme Court was not willing to admit a woman, much less a mar-
ried woman who was therefore “not fully a free agent,” to the practice
of law.198
Bradwell appealed this decision to the United States Supreme
Court.199 “Bradwell’s attorney argued that among the ‘privileges and
immunities’ guaranteed to each citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment
was the right to pursue any honorable profession.” 200 More specifi-
cally, he “argue[d] that admission to the bar of a State of a person
who possesses the requisite learning and character is one of those
[privileges and immunities which belong to a citizen of the United
States] which a State may not deny.” 201
The Supreme Court disagreed. Acknowledging that there were
“privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United
States . . . which a State is forbidden to abridge,” the Court none-
theless held that “the right to admission to practice in the courts of
a State is not one of them.” 202 The majority of the Court based its
decision solely on a consideration of privileges and immunities and
whether the admission to a state bar was a privilege and immunity
of citizenship of the United States.203 In so doing, the majority was
192. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”).
194. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137 (1872).
195. Kerber, Ourselves and Our Daughters, supra note 188, at 32.
196. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 132.
197. Id.
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able to avoid a discussion of whether Illinois’s policy that a woman
may not be admitted to the bar was acceptable.204 Just as the
Founders intended, the question of women’s rights was a question
left to the states. It was within Illinois’s power to determine whether
women should have the right to be admitted to the state bar.
The interesting thing about the Bradwell decision, however, is
the concurrence of three Justices.205 Written by Justice Bradley, the
concurrence demonstrates that, although the question of women’s
rights was left to the states, the federal judiciary was considering
state justification for the denial of those rights where before they had
not. In this case, however, Bradley agreed with the state. According
to Bradley, Bradwell’s claim that “the privileges and immunities of
women as citizens [allowed them] to engage in any and every pro-
fession, occupation, or employment in civil life,” was completely
ridiculous.206 Bradley argued that
civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to
the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say
identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong,
to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopt-
ing a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. . . .
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic]
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law
of the Creator.207
For Bradley, then, nature itself required that a woman’s place be in
the private sphere of the home and the family.
One of the most interesting aspects of Bradley’s concurrence is
his acknowledgment of the feme sole as a potentially capable woman.
He writes that “[i]t is true that many women are unmarried and not
affected by any of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising
out of the married state.” 208 The capable feme sole, however, was the
204. Id. at 132.
205. Id. at 139-42 (Bradley, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Swayne and Field).
206. Id. at 140.
207. Id. at 141.
208. Id. at 141-42.
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exception, not the rule, “[a]nd the rules of civil society must be
adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based
upon exceptional cases.” 209 It would not be proper nor sensible to
require Illinois to change its laws regarding admission to the state
bar simply because there may be a woman unfettered by the laws
of coverture.
Bradley’s concurrence reveals that although the question of
women’s rights may have been an issue for states to consider, it was
also on the federal judiciary’s radar. And despite his acknowledgment
of the expansion of a woman’s place in society, Bradley agreed that
“[i]t is the prerogative of the [state] legislator to prescribe regula-
tions founded on nature, reason, and experience for the due admis-
sion of qualified persons to professions and callings demanding special
skill and confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the
State . . . .” 210 The concurrence is therefore interesting because
Bradley does expound so long on the differences between men and
women when ultimately he says bar admission is properly left to the
prerogative of the state legislatures; it was not for the federal govern-
ment to set those restrictions.211
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bradwell is illustrative of the
fact that it was not the federal government that was restricting the
rights of women. It was the Illinois Supreme Court that determined
that women not be admitted to the state bar. Although the United
States Supreme Court affirmed this decision, it did so based on the
idea that it was for the states to determine who may or may not be
admitted to practice law within the individual states. The Supreme
Court did not declare that women may not or should not be admitted
to practice law.
Although the Constitution left to the states the opportunity to
recognize women’s rights, it also left to the states the opportunity to
deny them. As often happens, following closely on the heels of the
changes occurring in America was the backlash. When the men re-
alized that the women had begun their own kind of mini-revolution,
the response was to once again deny women access to the public
sphere. The men had at their disposal the tradition of the separate
spheres. According to the men, if women wanted to contribute to
politics, it could be done within the private, domestic sphere, as
“Republican Mothers.” 212
209. Id.
210. Id. at 142.
211. Id.
212. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 15, at 11.
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IV. THE BACKLASH
Although the Revolution provided a revolutionary politicization
of women, “the turn of the century [was] a period in which the bound-
aries between the sexes were sharpened and women left or were
pushed out of the formal political arena.” 213 This was the backlash.
“For many women the Revolution had been a strongly politicizing
experience, but the newly created republic made little room for
them as political beings.” 214 Americans needed to create “a political
context in which private female virtues might comfortably coexist
with the civic virtue that was widely regarded as the cement of the
Republic.” 215 Republican Motherhood offered the answer.216
As a Republican Mother, a woman could integrate the “political
values” she had learned or developed during the Revolution with
her “domestic life,” her private sphere.217 “Dedicated as she was to
the nurture of public-spirited male citizens, she guaranteed the
steady infusion of virtue into the Republic.” 218 In such a way, a
woman could meld her domesticity and familial obligations with her
political inclinations.219
Although Republican Motherhood allowed a woman a limited
justification for the continuation of “political education and political
sensibility,” 220 the reality of the Republican Mother was that she
served a very limited role.221 It “provided [her] no outlet . . . to affect
a real political decision.” 222 Although women had been politicized to
an extent, they were still “not fully political.” 223
The irony of this situation, though, is that Republican Motherhood
“would eventually usher women into public life as reformers and
activists.” 224 Benjamin Rush, one of the founding fathers, “declared
that ‘Virtue, Virtue alone . . . is the basis of a republic,’ expressing a
growing consensus of the early republic. Since women were the un-
tainted possessors of virtue, it would be their duty to ensure that
American society would remain as pure as women were.”225
213. Klinghoffer & Elkis, supra note 114, at 175.
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Republican Motherhood “granted women an increasing means
for direct action in the public sphere. In order to ensure that American
society was truly virtuous, women started to disseminate opinions
in print, effect legislation, and demonstrate publicly on behalf of
‘virtuous’ causes.” 226
Suffrage, however, was a different issue. When it came to the
issue of suffrage, there was a distinct split between the Republican
Mothers who believed female-led civic associations were the proper
use of a woman’s time and energy versus the Republican Mothers
who championed the suffrage movement.227 These two groups
disagreed about how women could best use their power of moral
superiority. Suffragists believed that the conduct and content of
electoral politics — voting and office holding — would benefit
from women’s special talents. But for others, woman suffrage was
not only inappropriate but dangerous. It represented a radical de-
parture from the familiar world of separate spheres, a departure
that would bring, they feared, social disorder, political disaster,
and, most important, women’s loss of position as society’s moral
arbiter and enforcer.228
Ultimately, the former still believed in and accepted the idea of the
separate spheres while the latter did not.229
As the states became less flexible in their view of women’s rights,
however, increasing numbers of women began to champion the suf-
fragist cause and fight back.230 The system of “male dominance” and
“female dependence” was a system “that women themselves [had
been] persuaded to cooperate in maintaining . . . . The idea of
‘woman’s place’ [was] sold to women as well as men — and often
sold to them by other women.” 231 But some women were no longer
interested in buying into that system, and by 1848, these women
were ready to speak out against and challenge that system.
In 1848, Seneca Falls, New York, hosted “[t]he first convention
in America on the subject of women’s rights.” 232 The women in atten-
dance adopted resolutions in order that they might show their dis-
satisfaction with the position of women in society.233 The Resolutions
226. Id. at 355.
227. Id. at 361.
228. Baker, supra note 32, at 620.
229. Rabinovitch, supra note 224, at 361.
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announced: that women were the equal of men;234 that the double
standard which required women to be virtuous yet imposed no such
requirement on men was unacceptable;235 that women would no
longer be satisfied with remaining in their private sphere;236 and
that women had duties which they had previously ignored but that
would no longer be overlooked.237
The women at the Seneca Falls convention declared not only that
women ought to be considered the equals of men, but also that it was
the duty of every woman to educate herself about the public sphere
so that women might make a claim to become part of it.238 In addi-
tion to the Resolutions, the convention also adopted a “Declaration
of Sentiments” mimicking the wording and style of the Declaration
of Independence.239 “We hold these truths to be self-evident,” the
Declaration of Sentiments begins, “that all men and women are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; [and] that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.” 240 The Declaration of Sentiments then went
on to discuss “such legal issues as obedience to one’s husband, divorce,
and marital property, and also to the double standards of morals.” 241
The first grievance listed was that women were denied the “right to
the elective franchise.” 242
Although these women’s rights movements, including the gather-
ing at Seneca Falls gained little to no “integration into the nineteenth-
century American public sphere,” what is important is that the women
were trying.243 Women were trying to rally and secure for themselves
234. See id. (resolving that “all laws which . . . place [woman] in a position inferior to
that of man, are contrary to the great precept of nature, and therefore of no force or
authority” and “woman is man’s equal — was intended to be so by the Creator, and the
highest good of the race demands that she should be recognized as such”).
235. Rabinovitch, supra note 224, at 355-56; See Minutes, supra note 233, at 77
(resolving that “the same amount of virtue, delicacy, and refinement of behavior, that
is required of woman in the social state, should also be required of man”).
236. See Minutes, supra note 233, at 77 (resolving that “it is time she should move in
the enlarged sphere which her great Creator has assigned her”).
237. See id. (resolving that “it is the duty of the women of this country to secure to
themselves their sacred right to the elective franchise [and] it is demonstrably the right
and duty of woman, equally with man, to promote every righteous cause, by every
righteous means”).
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rights which the Revolution had given the men in society. They in-
voked the American Revolution to explain their plight, throwing at
the men the same rhetoric and ideology the Americans had used
against the British a generation before.
CONCLUSION
When evaluating history, it is important to “recognize that sig-
nificant change more often occurs gradually rather than precipitously,
in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary manner. It is also true,
however, that some events are decisive and epoch-making, even if
their impact and import are not fully experienced and understood
until considerable time has passed.” 244 The Revolution was both revo-
lutionary and evolutionary. The former was the new Republic the
Revolution created seemingly overnight; the latter was that it “spe[d]
the integration of women into the civil polity.” 245 Where before
women had been pre-political, the Revolution began the process of
politicizing them.
Unlike the creation of the Republic, women’s politicization would
be an extraordinarily long process. Yet it is also important to recognize
and acknowledge that the change started during the Revolution and
continued into the new Republic. Throughout the process, American
society was aware of and discussing the changing roles of women.
Within this societal framework, the Constitution was adopted.
It is true that the Constitution did not explicitly guarantee rights
to women. But it did not revoke women’s rights, either. The states
had the option of granting or recognizing women’s rights. One state
chose to enfranchise women.246 Another state witnessed an internal
conflict in its legal system that involved an argument over whether
married women should be recognized as independent citizens capable
of taking independent action.247 Again, the important thing to recog-
nize here is that these debates were happening, sometimes in very
public ways, and the Constitution allowed them to happen.
Granted, the process would take over a century to achieve
women’s politicization.248 In part this was because the men had not
intended a revolution within their own society. When “any demands
244. Herman Belz, Liberty and Equality For Whom? How to Think Inclusively About
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for change” come from those not in the ruling bodies, it is not surpris-
ing that such demands “will be met with contestation and conflict,
if not direct suppression and violence.” 249 For those women fighting
the system, “at almost every step, whenever it seemed that women
were attempting to assume an active position of authority over men,
they were vehemently challenged by those who believed this departed
from ‘woman’s sphere.’ ” 250
It is important to recognize that this backlash occurred because
change was happening and people were advocating for that change.
The Constitution, though silent on the specifics, allowed the debate.
The Constitution did not provide sexist language with which the
men might attack the reformers. Instead, the Constitution allowed
the struggle to occur and eventually absorbed the women’s victory
into itself.
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